Vulnerability and Clientelism

Details

Research Team

Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter

Topic

Institutions

Publication

Journal publication

Country

Brazil

Region

Latin America & Caribbean

Tags

formal and informal sectors, institutional arrangements, lobbying, rent-seeking, shadow economy

Study Overview

This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens’ participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. Second, we exploit rainfall shocks.

Study Results

We find that reducing vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism.